Appropriations for water usage would be made under the act by the chief engineer of the Kansas Division of Water Resources. Two kinds of rights could be recognized: vested rights, the right of a user to continue consumption of water in the same quantities as was used before the act; and appropriated rights, what the chief engineer granted upon application showing beneficial use, under a doctrine of "first in time, first in right," (Corbin, 1972). Water could be pumped without a permit, but if the use impaired vested or appropriated rights, it could be stopped in court.

Wichita had purchased 25 well sites in the Equus Beds in 1941 under the common law doctrine, and in 1950 received vested rights from the state for use of 25,000 acre feet per year, based on the act and the pre-1945 use levels. The city also received an additional 15,000 acre feet of appropriation rights on July 23, 1948, when the city first made application. That was necessary before the first step could be taken to extend the supply. The subsequent passage of the bonds in 1952 implemented the city's right to the water.

Because of the allocation of water awarded to the city, five cities and one irrigator in the Equus Beds area filed suit on October 23, 1953, appealing the vested rights determination. Fifty-five land owners in Harvey County followed this action on July 16, 1954. After various proceedings, on November 12, 1957, District Court ruled that the 1945 law was unconstitutional, lacking due process. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed this decision on March 7, 1959, ruling for the city and returning the case to the lower court.

The city encountered other reactions during this period of time. The water issue was a constant subject in local papers as well as in other media throughout Kansas. Many lambasted the city for "stealing the water of other cities and the farmers and lowering the water table." The state legislature introduced punitive legislation attempting to shut off Wichita water, issuing warnings to the city. In addition, the Air Force sought assurance of a secondary supply as it re-evaluated its location in the city. Strong lobbying efforts were made in the legislature as bills were bandied about on the water issue. Although the bills, once labeled "the rape of Wichita" by Representative John Madden of Wichita, did not pass in force, many enemies of the city were created. (Eagle, 3/18/55).

The efforts of Wichita to expand the well field, acquire pipeline rights, and install additional wells resulted in immediate opposition of the cities, towns, irrigators, domestic users and other persons in the Equus Beds area who united to prevent further encroachment on their own water supply. Their efforts in court, both at the state and federal level, delayed construction of the new pipeline and wells as well as approval of the application for water permits for a number of years, threatening the entire use of the Equus Beds by the city. Wichita "could not endure the delays and could not continue to hazard its existence on a single source of water supply." (Howse, 1962). Therefore, during the fight for access to the Equus Beds, circumstances forced the city to continue efforts elsewhere.

Without free access to the groundwater, and pollution making the Arkansas River unattractive, the only reasonable alternative was to construct a surface water reservoir for a supplemental source. The federal government had studied the Arkansas River basin and the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation had devised a plan to construct reservoirs on the north and south forks of the Ninnescah River, at Cheney and at Murdock. The plan was supported by a federal belief in maximum natural resource development for multiple purposes. Then, in its desperate need for water, the city was fortunate to find that federal planning and assistance was available under circumstances that were both fortuitous and favorable. Because of the difficulties and implications to many jurisdictions in building dams and reservoirs, national planning had been implemented, and that affected what Wichita could do.

In the development of the national policy, the federal government determined the need for developing source sites with maximum-use multiple-purpose waterworks, and for evaluating local and non-local benefits and interests, which legally and financially made it virtually impossible for a municipality to build such a structure. Therefore, in order for the city to finance and build a reservoir on the Ninnescah River, a tributary of an interstate navigable river, federal approval of a dam and reservoir for a maximum-use multiple-purpose structure would be required. But the city could not finance the entire project alone. The alternative was for the federal government to construct the reservoir, with financial contributions by the city for the portion used for its purposes. The threat of legislation would be removed, a source of supply would be provided for the city, and supplemental benefits would be available from the reservoir for flood control, future irrigation, recreation and conservation.

In general, all of these factors--the litigation, the alternatives available, and the water crisis--would result in the city completing what had been discussed from the very beginning--the purchase of the Water Company. Since 1940, the city had owned the water supply facilities, while the company owned and operated the distribution. This hybrid arrangement was the only one of its kind in the country, the last similar arrangement in Miami having been terminated some 20 years previously. It also was the main complaint in the Equus Beds litigation, since the city was using municipal credit for the benefit of a private utility. In addition, the city's general debt structure was so high that financing additional water expansion through general obligation bonds was impossible without adversely affecting the general credit of the city, the county, the school board, and the university. The ability to use water revenue bonds was, therefore, essential, but that was not available so long as the private company controlled the water distribution system. Finally, "Federal participation was not available to a hybrid system in which federal funds might be involved for the profit of a private utility." (Howse, 1962). The city purchase of the Water Company became the only reasonable alternative, as it would allow the city to remove the principal causes of litigation, allow water revenue bond financing for the program, and make federal participation possible in building the reservoir. And those steps would allow for a reasonable settlement of the Equus Beds controversy and the city could then build the pipeline and wells necessary for providing a margin of safety until the reservoir was ready for use.

All the steps were tied together in a complex circle. The pipeline and well expansion was begun as an emergency measure. When it was delayed, the reservoir project was initiated, allowing the emergency supply installation, which would then provide the needed supply until the reservoir could be completed. But it all depended on the purchase of the company. "It was obvious that the key to the entire water program was municipal acquisition of the distribution properties of the water utility." (Howse, 1962).

The process leading to that solution, however, was a complex series of events involving multiple levels of government. By the end of 1954, the