An editorial in the Beacon on May 2 stressed the importance of the commission's actions: "Five men control the future of Wichita. These (Five City Commissioners) have extraordinary power, perhaps more power over the destiny of Wichita than any other five citizens in the history of the city...Water is the key to Wichita's future." It went on to claim that unless they acted, the city could lose its major industries, and the legislature, which had been barely prevented from passing bills to shut off the supply, might not stop the next year. The action hindering the adoption of the 23 points was also attacked as a policy that could lead to destruction. The next day, the Eagle, too, called for action: "If, like their predecessors, they refuse to face reality, Wichita will become a dying city. The time has come for action." Apparently the commissioners were listening, as they took action, partially spurred on by news from the federal government on May 3, 1955, that federal aid for the 60-inch pipeline would be held pending satisfactory termination of the litigation.

That same day, the City Commission officially declared its intention to develop Cheney Reservoir, marking a departure from the previous commitment to obtain its supply from the Equus Beds. The Eagle explained, "The move by the city to build a reservoir on the Ninnescah River marked an official abandonment of the city's past plans to expand its water resources in the counties to the north of Wichita by heading in a new direction westward to the Ninneseah." The resolution, presented by Howse, contained many other distinguishing factors as well. City Manager Smith was instructed to contract with local investment banking firms to obtain their financial advice on how to proceed with the project.

The resolution also "took the first formal step toward city purchase of the Wichita Water Company." (Eagle, 5/3/55). The city manager was to ask the company if it was interested in purchasing Wichita's supply system and where it would obtain its own additional sources of water, and, if it was not interested, to set a price for sale of its system. According to the Eagle report, "it was widely regarded as a formal prelude to city purchase of the company." Previous meetings of the commission and the Advisory Committees report, among other factors, had made it clear that continuing with the hybrid arrangement would make things very difficult. Commissioner H.D. Lester wanted to ask the company to buy the city system, but some, including Howse, believed it could not since the company did not have the power of eminent domain.

Finally, the resolution "held out an olive branch" to the opponents in the Equus Beds. It urged Equus Beds representatives to meet with the city to discuss an out-of-court settlement through a fact-finding commission to determine damages, in exchange for ending the litigation. (Eagle, 5/3/55).

The Equus Beds farmers were in strong support of the commissioner's action. On May 4, Don Williams, president of the Central Kansas Water Conservation Association (CKWCA), claimed that, by turning to Cheney for a new supply instead of to the Equus Beds, the commissioners were "heroes in the hearts of the farmers." (Eagle, 5/4/55). But he refused to commit himself to abandoning the law suits, even though he agreed to meet with the city. For a short period, the newspapers noted some relief in the tension as a result of the commission's stand. And even with the Cheney decision, talk also continued over a potential future need to use Kanopolis, a possibility once ruled out by the MAC.

Soon after the daily negotiations began between the city and Equus Beds representatives, a five-member committee was appointed June 9, 1955, in a joint meeting to coordinate further conferences. Although progress was slow, the committee of Howse and Willams, Newton Special Water Counsel J.O. Somers, Equus Beds Study Group Secretary J.W. Taylor, and McPherson Water and Power Superintendent Fred Diehl, made an honest effort.

On June 21, more significant actions occurred in the City Commission meeting when it met with Water Company officials. The company officially offered to buy Wichita's supply system, consolidate it with its own distribution system, and develop new water sources by November 1. The commission informally agreed to avoid taking action which would hinder such a purchase before November 1, but there was still opposition. Howse maintained the company could not increase the supply sufficiently without a huge increase in the cost. A meeting was set up for July 7 to discuss the details, since the reply was in letter form.

The commission then proceeded to enter into a contract with The Investment Group to act as financial consultants for the city in the water projects. A week later, June 28, 1955, the commission approved a 35 percent rate increase for the Water Company, after a request on April 12, 1955, which had been followed by research into the financial conditions of the company. Although Howse claimed the increase was an "outrage against the public," no recourse was seen, since the franchise guaranteed a certain profit. (Eagle, 4/12/55). Many felt that the company was able to increase its profit without showing it, through accounting tricks, but the increase was necessary according to contract. Later, on July 12, the commission reduced the surcharge from 60 percent to 45 percent to help offset the increase.

Commissioners met with the Water Company on July 7 to discuss possibilities of private purchase of the city system. A deadline was set for November 1 to receive the company's proposal. Many questions were asked in the meeting, with Howse leading the charge. In regard to how the company would handle the city's legal problems, J.J. Barr, vice-president of the American Water Works Company and director of the Wichita Water Company, claimed that the firm had experience with legal problems in other cities which were just as difficult. Further study would come as a potential price was developed.

Meetings continued with Equus Beds representatives and work on the pipeline continued despite the court cases. On August 2, 1955, the Bureau of Reclamation presented its plan to the City Commission for joint rnunicipal-federal participation in building Cheney Reservoir. Total cost was estimated to be $24,048,000, with the city paying from $12,698,000 to $15,701,000 for the three-mile dam, 16,600-acre lake, and 24-mile pipeline.

No money had been allocated in the current budget for preparation of future reports, since the city had not cooperated in previous requests for sponsorship, but an agreement was reached whereby the bureau would transfer some unexpended funds, and the city would pay $50,000 for immediate work on the reports. The push toward Cheney was beginning to gain momentum. Under the bureau's plan, the city would pay back the cost over a 50-year period, requiring state legislation, which at the time limited the period to 20 years. At least another year was estimated for a full feasibility report, and two years before authorization from Congress.

Shortly thereafter, the progress which had seemed to be developing in the Equus Beds dispute fell apart. After having negotiations with the Equus Beds representatives since May 3, the commission voted, upon recommendation by Howse, to terminate negotiations because of what was considered a "double-cross" by the CKWCA Attorney Speir. In a written policy statement which was adopted by the City Commission, Howse said that he had felt that no progress was being made with the representation of the CKWCA but that he wanted to try every means