With the delay of the sale, Howse contended that the city had lost a great deal of money because of higher interest rates. He later wrote that, following the vote, "Several members of the syndicate advised (him) that the water revenue bond interest vote was affected adversely by at least one percent to one and one half percent as a result of the City Commission in their: 1) procrastination; 2) delay; 3) criticism of Cheney as an additional source of supply; 4) cancellation of the water management contract which would have assured competent utility management; and 5) criticism which forced the withdrawal of local investment banking firms from the national syndicate formed for competitive bidding purposes. If the factor of one percent penalty interest is applied, it is clear that the city of Wichita is paying the price of $100,000 in excess annual interest payments because of the composition of its municipal governing body in 1957." (Howse, 1962). Howse was clearly critical of the actions of Madden and Stevens. As it turned out, the city was able later to refinance the bonds at a more favorable interest rate, offsetting any adverse costs of the actions by the commission in the 1950's.

With the interest rate as accepted, the city would repay the bonds over a 30-year period, paying $40,224,255 in interest for a total cost of $82,049,255. After 13 years, the city had the option to pay off the bonds with a considerable interest savings. On October 1, the commission officially approved the city's prospectus for the bonds, at the request of the First Boston Corporation, manager of the syndicate.

In addition, on October 1, an August 19 report by Madden and Howse on their trip to Washington to discuss Cheney was received by the commission. In general, the report recommended constant coordination and attention by the city in lobbying the 1958 Congressional session. This included approving travel from Washington to Wichita by important officials, the appointment of a city representative to help the effort in Washington on a once-a-month basis, and preparing a brief clarifying the city's position for federal organizations. The report was being held in the office of Secretary of Interior Fred A. Seaton pending further reviews. Howse recommended a meeting with the federal and state officials involved in the project. Overall, it emphasized that, if the city wanted the necessary federal approval, it would have to work for it. The commission followed the report's recommendation and appointed Howse to act as the city's representative for the Cheney project.

The report caused another conflict. While Madden made the original motions to accept the report and appoint Howse, he disavowed the report. According to Howse, Madden had attended only one meeting during the entire week and had requested that his name be attached to the report. Howse claimed this was "verified by subsequent events" and that "Madden never did make his objections specified and in fact could not do so, because he had no knowledge of the facts outlined in the report since he was not present during any of the conferences except one." (Howse, 1962).

Bids for the $1.7 million Equus Beds expansion were also received on October 1. Seven contracts were to be let for 20 new supply wells, well houses, pumps and appurtenances, pipe, collecting lines, a central control system, and power lines with some 39 bids read. As usual, controversies resulted. Layne-Western Company submitted bids for the wells and for the pumps, stipulating the condition that both bids be accepted. Its combined bid was $44,792 less than the next lowest combination, but on a majority vote, after Morton advised them that joint contracts could not be let after reading bids separately, the commission voted to readvertise for the bids. This was opposite of what had happened in the earlier Equus Beds contract. In another instance, the commission voted to force S & S Construction Company to keep its bid on power lines even though it reported a $20,983 error. Stevens moved at that point to reject all bids and call new ones but was defeated 3 to 2. Eventually five bids were accepted for the projects. Madden, who had joined with Stevens's motion, called the day, "A day of mistakes. A day with confusion. A day of deviation." (Eagle, 10/2/57). At the same meeting, Howse was authorized by the commission to serve as the official representative on the Cheney project, a move which would later stir controversy.

Over the next month, work commenced on preparing for the takeover of the Water Company, with ordinances on salaries, rates, and general rules and regulations over the city operation of the utilities required. But problems still remained. On October 8, a form of circular used by underwriters in selling the city revenue bonds was approved, at the request of the syndicate purchasing them, but only by a 3 to 2 vote. This split came in spite of the fact that the bonds were sold and the city was obligated to approve, according to Howse.

But that was not all, nor the most important action to be taken. Before the purchase of the Water Company could be consummated, an ordinance had to be passed which would fix the interest rate on the water revenue bonds, as had been bid. But on October 16, when the ordinance was brought up, and again on the 17th, the commission could not get a quorum. Baird was on vacation in Michigan and Stevens and Madden were both reported to be out of town. Madden later confirmed that he had deliberately skipped the meeting so that there would be a lack of quorum. Backstrom told Howse and Gardner that, "It is absolutely urgent that this ordinance be passed and published before the closing date for the sale." Two readings were necessary to pass the ordinance, requiring a special meeting because of the adjournments. When asked what would happen if the ordinance were not passed, Backstrom said it could prevent the city from meeting the deadline to take over the company by the closing date, November 1. Morton added, "We are at the point now where failure to meet the deadline on any point could jeopardize the entire closing arrangement." (Beacon, 10/16/57). Ordinances determining water rates, rules, and regulations were also set for vote.

The commission met on October 22 and dealt with the crucial issues. But as seemed to happen so often in the history of Wichita, another stalemate resulted. Four 2 to 2 votes were taken by the commission, resulting in an impasse and a failure to set either the 4.4949 percent interest rate on the revenue bonds, or to pass the various ordinances. The ordinances up for a vote would have provided for the terms and regulations for providing water by the city at the time of its takeover, fixed the interest rates on the bonds which had already been sold, and directed delivery of the bonds to New York for payment on October 30. The city manager urged passage, and Morton "pointed out the chaos, damages, and years of litigation that would result if the city failed to comply with its obligations in these respects." (Howse, 1962). In spite of all serious urging, Stevens and Madden voted down the ordinances.

Ranson reported later the action on the water bonds could cost the city millions in higher interest at a later date. He said that news of the city's standoff had spread rapidly throughout the bond market, from Chicago to New York. First of Boston, one of the largest investment houses in the nation, and which led the combine which held the bond contract, said that it "could be quoted that if delivery of the bonds is delayed as much as one day, they never again will bid on a Wichita bond issue." (Beacon, 10/23/57). New York bond purchasers also warned the city that the "A" bond rating could be downrated as a result.

After the meeting failed to get results, an urgent phone call was made to Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada, to inform Baird of the drastic turn of events. The bond interest ordinance had to be passed by the 25th so that it could be published and become part of the bond sale. It appeared that only if he returned could the stalemate be resolved.

At the same time, other interesting occurrences took place. Madden was questioned about his opposition to the Water Company purchase, since it contradicted a stand he had apparently taken in 1955. The April 19, 1955, commission minutes read, "Representative John Madden