By this time, the Equus Beds law suits were still in court, although much of the problem had dissipated. By the middle of 1958, the Eagle concluded, "The five year battle between Wichita city authorities and farmers in the Equus Beds may be a thing of the past." Two reasons were cited for the change. The court cases had constantly gone in favor of the city, with few legal remedies remaining for the farmers. Most importantly, rain in the recent months had broken the drought, recharging the Equus Beds and raising the water table in spite of Wichita's pumping. (Eagle, 5/3/58).

By this time the Cheney project was under consideration by state and federal agencies, and that consideration became linked to the pollution efforts in the city. The Cheney project had become federal in scope, involving the agreement of five other states. The Ninnescah was, according to federal definition, part of the Arkansas, White, and Red river basins as a tributary of the Arkansas River, and that basin was one of ten set up in 1950 to develop interstate water agreements.

According to an analysis of the complicated matter in the Beacon on June 30, "As far back as 1955, Wichitans have been told repeatedly that the problems of water supply and pollution abatement are inextricably tied together." The interstate compact, developed as a result of Congressional action on the basins, was set up based on the principle that "States within any single river basin share an equal interest in the river and want to know how much water each state is getting from rivers, and tributaries within the basin, and also how much each state is polluting the water supply within the river basin." In addition, five separate federal agencies became involved, since the Arkansas was defined as a navigable stream. As a result, now the city not only had to deal with state requirements on pollution, "but also must answer directly to the U.S. government for any failure to take the necessary steps to reduce its pollution of a federally controlled waterway."

It is important to understand how the federal government's involvement in the pollution question influenced the acceptance of Cheney Reservoir. The quantity of treated water the city would return to the basin would determine the quantity it could withdraw. If 40 million gallons of water per day was needed and no pollution abatement program was initiated to reclaim the water, all 40 million gallons would be charged to the city as consumptive use. If, however 35 million gallons could be treated to meet the standards of the Public Health Service and returned, only five million gallons would be charged.

A letter from Metzler to the U.S. Public Health Service reinforced the link. The Beacon said the letter claimed, "Total pollution abatement must be carried out in the Wichita area or the Ninnescah Reservoir as a source of future supply will be a flop." The letter also indicated how the level of pollution in the city would determine the water demand from the reservoir: "The city of Wichita should be reminded that its program of pollution abatement is closely associated with this program to provide additional water supply. Unless pollution abatement facilities are provided as agreed...additional stream flows will be required in the Arkansas River. Should the load from the Wichita area...require additional dilution water...this might require greater release from the Cheney Reservoir than was contemplated in the engineering and economic studies." (Beacon, 7/31/58).

One other factor that is of significance is the role Howse played in the entire process. From the very beginning, Howse was instrumental in water and pollution matters. He believed that an adequate water supply was inseparable from the problem of pollution and felt that the two should be resolved simultaneously. According to Corbin's analysis of the Cheney project, Howse assumed control of the reign of power in the city. He developed contacts with state officials and maintained those contacts throughout the process. When necessary he used state pressure to push the water plans forward.

Through contacting state officials, Howse was able to increase demands placed on the city about pollution. By way of a phone call, he was able to arrange meetings, get the state to write a letter to the city threatening to enforce state codes, or have it demand action by the city. "Thus he was able to develop state pressure to support his long range plan for Wichita's water supply," Corbin wrote in 1972. As a result of these pressures, opposition to his strong-arm tactics grew. Howse also represented the city on pollution matters. With his influence, he "to a considerable extent, was able to control the nature, timing, and urgency of demands made on the city about sanitation and pollution." (Corbin, 1972). Throughout the adoption of the water policy, Howse continued to rely heavily on the state pressure to get action. According to Corbin, he also sought help from the Wichita-Sedgwick County Health Department, which filed a report with the commission that the north end of Wichita was "the worst area of bad environmental sanitation in the county." (Howse, 1962).

In some ways Howse's tactics backfired, as opposition to the Ninnescah project grew, not only because of facts about the project itself, but also "because of the aggressive and abrasive personality of Howse...He was becoming the focal point of contention and there were attacks upon him as well as upon the policies he supported." (Corbin, 1972).

These factors were pertinent from the beginning and reached the forefront in Baird's opposition to the Water Company purchase and the election of Madden and Stevens in 1957. The feud within the commission only managed to make matters worse, as the city "defied the State Board of Health for months on the question of cleaning up its pollution." It became well known that "certain City Commissioners have in the past fought adequate secondary sewage treatment" and that "there has been no unanimous agreement nor unanimous support of the Ninnescah project," according to an article in the Beacon on July 1, 1958. In addition, the first action of the new commission in 1957 was to reverse the annexation of two acres around the city which had been taken in to allow pollution control. The Beacon then concluded, "All these past actions have a direct bearing on the fate of the Ninnescah Reservoir and will no doubt be weighed by Congress in the granting or denying of approval for the Ninnescah project."