This new alternative added complexity to the already jumbled situation. Later in the month, Wynkoop told the Eagle, in an interview published on April 19, 1978, that Wichita was "absolutely not locked into development of Corbin Reservoir," although he added it had to be considered the best alternative. Cost continued to act as a deterrent. "The costs are the only thing that bother me. I'll be the first to admit that," he said.

As plans for Corbin were pursued, conflicts continued to abound. In May, 1978, farmers from the Chikaskia River basin met with Governor Bennett to lobby against construction of the reservoir, showing their continued activism. Later that year the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior released a preliminary draft of its ecological report on the Chikaskia project, dated September, 1978, which objected to many aspects of the bureau's report, claiming that adequate precautions had not been taken to protect the wildlife habitat. A list of recommendations called for various changes to be incorporated into the bureau's plan, including making available land around the reservoir to the Kansas Fish and Game Commission for wildlife management and providing for improved fishing conditions.

In a letter reviewing the draft on September 25, 1978, Wynkoop informed Jerry Wright of the Bureau of Reclamation that, "As I read the report I had the feeling that the Fish and Wildlife Service was describing a completely different project than the one we have worked on, with its objective of providing for municipal and industrial use." He went on to say that he believed the improvements recommended by the service enhanced the project, to which Wichita did not object "as long as the cost is borne by those who benefit and not the water purchasers." If Wichita was to pay for additional water for downstream releases, then Wynkoop expected the city to have the first call on the water when it was needed. (Water Department Files).

In general, Wynkoop objected to contradictions in the report and comments on endangered species which would be affected by the dam. "Nothing could be further from the truth," he claimed, "and it is misleading for that information to be presented in such a manner." At the end, he concluded, "All in all, the report is about what I expected." (Water Department Files). Although there was no direct effect of the report on the project, it added one more complicating factor, which did more to put off a final decision. As the opposition to Corbin grew, and the political infighting increased, the chances for its rapid adoption diminished.

While Corbin remained in the works, other alternatives continued to be presented. On November 14, 1978, City Commissioner Porter sent a letter to City Manager E.H. Denton asking, "Why would we not be able to (hypothetically) buy land in Harvey County (Equus Beds), obtain the water rights under that land and rent out the land for agri-purposes?" Wynkoop and Director of Law John Dekker informed Porter on January 3, 1979, that "such a land acquisition as you suggest would require a taking of approximately 100,000 acres at a cost of $155,000,000. In all probability, it would also require several years of condemnation proceedings. Finally, the acquisition of the land does not insure the city's rights to the water under the acquired acreage because Kansas law stipulates that the water belongs to the people of Kansas for their beneficial use and is governed by Water Resource Board of the State of Kansas." (City Managers Files). The Equus Beds continued to be an elusive target.

Conservation was also always discussed as an option, although experts normally claimed that it had little impact except in clear emergencies. Since Wichita water was metered, the city already employed the most effective conservation device. Nevertheless, in response to a request from the commission, Wynkoop presented a three-point conservation proposal to the commission on March 20, 1979. It would raise summertime rates to discourage excessive watering of lawns, call for new codes requiring water saving plumbing for new buildings, and expand the public education program. As options, and not recommendations, Wynkoop also mentioned limiting the area served by the Water Department and discouraging large industrial water users from locating in Wichita. The commission referred the policy to various boards for consideration, and eventually it faded from view. Conservation is necessary and practical in a crisis, but not an alternative to a new supply.

Soon after, Kanopolis was renewed as a potential future source. On April 16, 1979, the three-member board of the Kanopolis Irrigation District unanimously voted to disband. Paul Aylward of Ellsworth, the board's attorney, said it had declared itself "inoperative and dormant." (Eagle, 4/18/79). According to state law, a 12-month waiting period would be required in which the district board would not meet. Then a petition for official dissolution of the district would be sent to the Division of Water Resources of the Department of Agriculture. After receiving the petition, and holding a hearing to determine that the district had no property or debts, that its board had not met for a year, and that the district was not functioning, the district could be officially dissolved.

That possibility would allow the water for municipal and industrial users, including Wichita. Much could happen during the year-long interim period. Area citizens, for example, could form a new district with different boundaries. Even if water became available, Wichita would have to get in line behind other users, such as Salina and McPherson, for water rights. But the possibility was improving.

Howse's water committee in 1954 had considered Kanopolis, but questioned the cost, the distance of 65 miles, and the quality of the supply. Since that time, the cost of alternatives had increased, a fair distance seemed inevitable, and the reservoir was planned for expansion. All this made Kanopolis more attractive. One benefit was that the reservoir lay uphill from Wichita, which meant that the water could flow to the city mainly by gravity, while Corbin would require uphill pumping. A long time remained before final action could be taken, but with the delay in Corbin, and the need for planning, Wichita began studying Kanopolis.

By this point, the Corbin Reservoir had been under consideration for a number of years, and many deadlines had already passed. President Jimmy Carter had taken action to improve management and efficiency of federal water projects, and that was one reason for the delay. On June 6, 1978, Carter released his initiatives to improve planning and efficiency of federal water projects, to emphasize water conservation, to enhance federal-state cooperation and improve state planning, and to increase attention toward environmental quality.

In the review of water policies and programs leading to his proposals, Carter found 25 separate federal agencies spending over ten billion dollars a year on water projects, which were often planned without a standard basis for estimating costs and benefits. He also found a $34 billion backlog of authorized or uncompleted projects. In addition, while states were primarily responsible for water policy within their boundaries, they were not actively involved in sharing in federal project planning and funding. Carter was concerned that various water projects were environmentally unsound, causing losses of natural streams and wildlife habitats, and that water conservation had not been addressed at a national level.

In order to improve federal water programs, Carter took a number of actions, including placing an equal emphasis on national economic development and environmental quality, adding water conservation as a specific component of both objectives, and planning for the preparation of a principles and standards manual to ensure effective information for determine costs and benefits.

Establishing priorities for water funds was also an important step. The criteria to be used included economic benefits significantly outweighing net adverse environmental consequences, a stress on water conservation, evidence of active public support, absence of significant inter-governmental problems, and projects in compliance with all relevant environmental statutes, among others. The President's initiative also incorporated steps to improve cost sharing by the states for water projects.

Similar actions and criteria were specified to emphasize water conservation, enhance federal-state cooperation, and increase environmental protection. One agency affected by the action was the Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation. These new directives combined with local opposition, environmental questions, and the overall lack of support, acted to reduce the likelihood of Corbin's passage.

The bureau's work on the project was delayed slightly as a result of incorporating the new standards into the studies. Soon, the local officials reacted to the delay. The Wichita Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the Bureau of Reclamation on May 3, 1979, regarding the problems, along with letters to Kansas senators and representatives asking for help. James Foster, manager of the chamber's Public Affairs Department, informed Andy Peck that the Water Resource Committee of the chamber had concluded, "At the present time the bureau is in a constant state of delay on this project. A decision on this project has been promised several times, only to have that decision delayed by further study or re-study of certain areas of the project." Complaining that the delays were becoming "frustrating," Foster wrote, "While we are sure it is not the intent of the bureau to study this project to death, the committee has requested that I write to you and request a written schedule on this project." (Water Department Files).

Peck responded on June 1, 1979, noting the new federal initiatives, "The additional workload required as a result of comments received on the review draft report and implementation of recent water policy changes has been difficult to superimpose on an already heavy, high-priority